get people to do things they otherwise might not have done. 2 As Harold Laski put it in 1939, American Presidents who secured the support of the people "aroused the dynamic of democracy, an energy, when it is aroused, more powerful and more pervasive than the dynamic of any other form of state. ' Laski, of course, lamented that the presidency was not stronger than it was. Yet he realized that constitutional vagueness, precedent, war, and socioeconomic pressures had steadily expanded executive power. Like many political scientists, then and since, he thought the presidency to be America's strongest weapon against the banes of social progress: sectionalism, decentralized parties, corporate power, and totalitarianism abroad.
It is hard to quarrel seriously with this general view of the rise of presidential power in America. I will not reiterate it at great length here. But I will recapitulate it briefly, offering qualifications where appropriate. I will also focus on two areas given relatively little attention in those standard accounts which tend to focus narrowly on constitutional development: the growth of popular expectations about the presidency and the relationship between electoral trends and executive power.
Nothing gave the founding fathers more difficulty than the problem of executive power. Many leaders, remembering the excesses of the Crown, called for legislative supremacy. Edmund Randolph argued that a single head of state would become "the foetus of monarchy." Patrick Henry complained that the Constitution was a "squint toward monarchyV. 4 Other leaders, however, wished to strengthen the existing system. "Shall we have a King?" John Jay asked after Shays' rebellion in 1787. Perplexed, the framers settled for the cryptic phrase: "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States." ' 5 The Constitution added that the President should be Commander in Chief of the armed forces; that he could issue pardons and reprieves; that, with the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, he could "make" treaties; that he could nominate important officials; that he would administer the laws; and that he would "receive ambassadors and other public ministers." In part because of constitutional vagueness, in part because of the newness of political institutions, the early presidents were relatively weak in three respects. First, they felt obliged to refrain from using the veto power except on constitutional grounds. Washington vetoed only two bills, Adams and Jefferson none, Madison six. (Presidents between 1817 and 1936 issued 742 vetoes.)' Second, they operated on a small scale: In 1800, when the government moved to Washington, seven packing cases sufficed to move the entire archives of the executive departments. Third, Presidents Washington and Adams did not see themselves as party leaders. Though they awarded contracts in ways aimed at developing local support, and though they sought to counteract the opposition press, they did not try hard to build up a party apparatus, to intervene in local elections, or to manage the news.
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Modern presidential leadership involves five major roles or constituencies: contending with Congress, managing the institutionalized office of the executive branch, heading the party, dealing with interest groups, and directing foreign policy. In the 1 7 90s the first three roles remained in very early stages of development; and the fourth, controlling interest groups, seemed largely irrelevant.
The impact of the presidency at home was slight indeed.
Yet from the beginning Washington took advantage of constitutional powers, both explicit and implied. In so doing he set lasting precedents. Thus he insisted on the right to name and to remove heads of departments. Thex were to be presidential assistants, not-as in parliamentary systems-rival ministers. Using his powers as Commander in Chief, he dealt firmly with the whiskey rebellion in Pennsylvania. An efficient administrator, he profited fiom the absence of a large bureaucracy and of well-organized pressure groups. He left an important, if immeasurable, legacy of confidence in the central government."
His chief legacy was in the realm of foreign affairs. As Jay had argued' in the Federalist Papers, the executive had inherent advantages in conducting foreign relations: capacity for secrecy and dispatch, superior sources of information, and (compared to Congress, which was only infrequently in session), constant involvement in overseas matters. ' Washington used these advantages to secure the initiative. During his two terms he employed special presidential agents to conduct diplomacy; he negotiated treaties without prior consultation with Congress; he assumed the authority to issue a Neutrality Proclamation; and he reserved the right to recognize or to snub foreign emissaries."' When the House, upset at the jay Treaty with England, asked for papers relating to it, Washington refused to provide them. The House then passed resolutions stating that it had the power (through appropriations)
to implement or to hamstring treaties, and that it need not disclose its reasons for asking for information. In so doing it proudly upheld its constitutional authority. In practice, however, Washington had his way. Then, and later, the House shrank from obstructing treaties negotiated by the executive branch and ratified by the Senate." 1 Jefferson, it seemed, enhanced the role of the presidency. Confronting Chief Justice Marshall, he appeared to argue that executive privilege permitted him to withhold a letter from the court, and to ignore a subpoena that he appear in person to testify. 2 In the realm of foreign affairs he led the way in securing the Louisiana territory, and he spent unappropriated funds on munitions after England attacked the Chesapeake in 1807. Using his authority as Commander in Chief, he authorized the navy to retaliate against pirates on the Barbary Coast. United States ships, he ordered, should "chastise their [pirates'] insolence-by sinking, burning, or destroying their ships wherever you shall find them.' 3 Jefferson was especially innovative as a party and congressional leader. As head of the emerging Republican party, he capitalized on its existence. He supported a party press, promoted partisan supporters in local constituencies, developed congressional liaison, and worked tirelessly with party managers on Capitol Hill. Thanks to his long-time contacts with important legislative leaders, to the absence of well-developed pressure groups, and to Congress' relatively small size, which facilitated tight organization, he dominated the legislature as no subsequent president has been able to do.' 4 Many scholars, however, have shown that Jefferson left the presidency weaker, if anything, than when he took office.'
5 In his dispute with Marshall, he was careful never to claim too much. Thus he conceded that he could be required to testify, and he agreed to deliver the letter to the court. (As it turned out, neither his appearance nor the letter was called for, so the issue was not clearly resolved.)' 6 The President was equally restrained in handling foreign policy. The purchase of Louisiana and the chastisement of pirates were widely popular actions for which he was careful to seek congressional sanction.
Even Jefferson's congressional and party leadership, temporarily so effective, was impossible to emulate. Opponents of President Jackson complained loudly that "King Andrew" was subverting the nation. Henry Clay said, "We are in the midst of a revolution, hitherto bloodless, but tending rapidly towards a total change of the pure republican character of the Government, and to the concentration of all power in the hands of one man." Daniel Webster added, "the President carries on the government; all the rest are subcontractors .... A Briareus sits in the centre of our system, and with his hundred hands touches everything, controls everything." 18 Modern commentators, though refusing to take such partisan rhetoric at face value, have noted changes in the institution of the presidency during Jackson's time. Edward Corwin concluded that "Jackson's presidency was, in truth, no mere revival of the office-it was a remaking of it."
19 Leonard White, author of the most authoritative study of American governmental administration, identified four key developments during the Jacksonian presidency: elaboration of the theory that the president was the direct representative of the people; extension of the veto power to include policy disagreements; unrestrained use of the removal power, leading to creation of a spoils system; and the establishment of presidents as leaders of mass political party organizations.
2 ' Evidence of Jackson's assertiveness is readily available. In broadening the removal power, he fired cabinet officers almost at will, and surrounded himself with personal advisors-a "Kitchen Cabinet"-beholden only to himself.
21
In extending the veto power, he refused to turn over to Congress the draft of the national bank veto that he had read to his cabinet. His refusal made another presidential claim: the right to confidentiality in exchanges with advisers. Challenging the Supreme Court, which had upheld the constitutionality of the bank, he added, "Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others.... The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that point the President is independent of both. Jackson's chief legacy was his claim, as leader of a new, mass party, to speak for all the people. Like Franklin Roosevelt one hundred years later, he came to office at a time when other social forces-largely anterior to and independent of presidential policies-were moving masses of new voters to the polls for the first time. Claiming to speak on behalf of these new voters, Jackson set himself up as the first popular democratic leader in American history. In so doing he made the presidency a more attractive, and potentially more attainable, prize. Thus it was that such innovations as the national nominating convention, though originating among Jackson's opponents, killed the power of King Caucus. Then, as later in American history, the presidency had unanticipated but far-reaching ramifications on other political institutions. 23 Still, it is easy to exaggerate Jackson's power. Neither the size nor the structure of the executive branch changed much during his time. Congress did not agree to expansion of the White House staff until 1857, when it authorized a private secretary at $2500 a v'ear, a steward at $1200, and a messenger at S900.
2
1 Presidents, mired in handling patronage, rarely considered it their duty to develop programs. Jackson, indeed, was less a policy maker than a defender of states' rights, of small government, of old-fashioned republican values.
2 5 His achievements were largely destructive or preventive. Moreover, increases in presidential activity did not mean that other institutions suffered correspondingly, or that power seeking was a zero-sum game. Congress, more assertive than ever, dominated the government between 1848 and 1860. As Corwin put it, Jackson's " 'dictatorship' " was "more bark than bite, more proclamation than performance.
26
Jackson. in short, was an exception to the general rule of weak presidents in the nineteenth century. He asserted strong claims, only to see them denied to his successors. Such authority as his stemmed from the coincidence, rare in American history, of two unusual forces: his own strong personality, and the sharp increases in electoral turnout which facilitated the development of mass-based, nonsectional political parties and of popular presidential leadership. By the 1840s, this combination began to break down. The parties fell victim to divisive sectional issues; new, weaker leaders proved unable to take comm and; Congress reasserted itself; and the presidency suffered accordingly. If political changes provided one source of potential presidential authority in the early nineteenth century, wars and foreign policy provided the other. As early as 1790, Congress gave Washington $40,000 to spend as he saw fit on Unpublicized diplomatic missions, and in 1811 President Madison received a secret congressional appropriation of $100,000 in order to take temporary possession of land south of Georgia. The appropriation was not disclosed until 1818.27 In 1817 President Monroe showed what a president could do with the authority as Commander in Chief by sending General Andrew Jackson into Florida to battle the Seminoles. Jackson's imperious behavior nearly provoked war with Spain, which controlled the area. In the same year, Monroe pioneered use of the executive agreement, later a useful way of bypassing congressional consent to treaties.
2
Six years later Monroe's doctrine concerning Latin America, while binding on no one, was proclaimed in such a way as to make it cquasi-official policy of the United States." ' James Polk dramatically extended such powers. By stationing troops on disputed territory, he invited hostilities with Mexico. When fighting broke out, he hurried the Congress into recognizing a state of war. In the struggle which followed he demonstrated, in White's words, "the administrative capacities of the presidency as a war agency. He proved that a President could run a war."'I' Elaborating on Jackson's concept of popular leadership, Polk explained that -[t]he president represents in the executive department the whole people of the United States, as each member of the legislative department represents portions of them.."
1
When Lincoln took office thirteen xears later, he might have used such Jacksonian justifications for expanding presidential authority. In fact, he did not. A former Whig, he believed in congressional supremacy over legislative matters, and in a strong cabinet. During his administrations he vetoed only one bill, he left legislative initiative to Congress, and he tolerated broad disagreement from members of his cabinet-. 28. E. CORwIN, supra note I, at 212-14.
29. That is, President Monroe and his succCssors frequently alluded to the Doctrine in ways that led Americans to regard it as a national policy. to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures otherwise unconstitutional might become lawful by becoming inclispensable to the preservation of the Constitution through the preservation of the nation.
So it was that Lincoln used the crisis situation of 1861 to act without congressional sanction. He created a national army out of state militias, maneuvered the country into war over Fort Sumter, called out forty thousand volunteers for three years service, doubled the regular army, blockaded southern ports, and spent two million dollars in funds for unauthorized purposes. Later he suspended the right of habeas corpus and issued an Emancipation Proclamation on his own authority-an announcement as imperious as the czar's emancipation of the serfs. Lincoln's sweeping assertions of authority revealed the essential inability of Congress to curb or even to oversee a dynamic president bent on acting clecisively in times of emergency. His moves, indeed, stunned even those who sympathized with the northern cause. The abolitionist Wendell Phillips called him an "unlimited despot." Lord Bryce said that Lincoln "wielded more authority than any single Englishman has done since Oliver Cromwell.
3 5 The Supreme Court, however, sustained his conception of emergency power, changing its mind only after the war was over. And the voters returned him to office, although by a very narrow margin, in 1864. As Bryce pointed out, the source of Lincoln's unparalleled power was not only the perceived emergency but the democratic base of the American system. 3 " Presidential authority, then as alvays, depended heavily on power to persuade, and that, in turn, rested on popular consent. Though Lincoln lacked mass backing for his policies, he could count at least on popular acquiescence-and that proved more than enough to sustain his actions. Lincoln's successor, Andrew Johnson, talked in the Jacksonian vein. "Your President," he said, "is now the Tribune of the people, and, thank God, I am, and I intend to assert the power which the people have placed in me.-3 a 7 Acting accordingly, he developed his own Reconstruction policies. Though impeached, he stood firm against the Tenure of Office Act, which remained inoperative until its eventual repeal in 1887. His successors in the White House displayed moments of comparable assertiveness. Hayes and Garfield ultimately "won" a protracted struggle with Congress, which had attempted to dictate key appointments, including those of cabinet posts. Hayes vetoed seven House riders to appropriation bills before securing his ends. Confirm- "There is no greater object of ambition on the political stage on which men are permitted to move" than the presidency of the United States. C. Rossi itR, supra note I at 3. In an age of bureaucratic expansion and rampant economic centralization, the weak institutional base of the White House was a distinct liability to ambitious presidents.
Why did the presidency fail to expand in the post-Ci\ il \ar years? One reason was the reaction, expressed by the Court in Milligan,, against the excesses of Lincoln. Congress chimed iIn bx challenging Johnson and his followers. In 1868 it repealed existing laws which had given presidents discretion to 38 Broader economic and political forces sustained this long-lived congressional renaissance. Chief among these was the rise of interest groups, especially corporations, which expanded dramatically and dominated the legislative branch. Later, these groups would call on the executive branch for protection against other groups. In the post-Civil War era, however, they were generally content with legislative government and compliant executive leadership. Political forces inhibiting the White House included sectionalism, which divided the parties and prevented any President from claiming to represent all the people; party competitiveness, which resulted in very close elections and in divisions between the executive and legislative branches; and the essential stability of voter turnout. Unlike Jefferson or Wilson before 1919, the post-Civil War Presidents could not count on consistent partisan majorities in Congress. Unlike Jackson or Franklin Roosevelt, they could not claim the support of a miassive, "new" electorate.
Given these forces, it was not surprising that contemporary observers of political developments saw little future for the presidency. Professor Woodrow Wilson noted in 1885 that Congress had "entered more and more into the details of administration until it has virtually taken into its own hands all the substantial powers of government." The presidency, he concluded, was "too silent and inactive, too little like a premiership [which Wilson wanted his country to adopt] and too much like a superintendancy."" 4 Lord Brvce, after asking rhetorically "why great men are not chosen presidents," explained that 
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In 1898 the political scientist Henry Jones Ford heralded the rise of the twentieth century presidency. Tracing the growth of executive power under Jackson and his successors, Ford concluded that "in the presidential office . .. American democracy has revived the oldest political institution of the race, the elective kingship. It is all there: the precognition of the notables and the ttmultuous choice of the freemen, only conformed to modern conditions."'"' Wilson, reversing himself in 1900, agreed. The President, he said, was "now at the front of affairs, as no President, except Lincoln, has been since the first quarter of the nineteenth century .... Upon his choice, his character, his experience, hang some of the most weighty issues of the future."--"
In reaching this conclusion both men (especially Wilson) stressed the rise of America to status as a world power. Reflecting currents of opinion which grew in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, Wilson said that "when foreign affairs play a prominent part in the politics and policy of a nation, its Executive must of necessity be its guide: must utter every initial judgment, take every first step of action, supply the information upon which it is to act, suggest and in large measure control its conduct. Ford and Wilson might have paid more attention to another source of presidential expansion. This was the dramatic change in American politics which followed the depression of the 1890s and the polarizing elections of 1894 and 1896. The Republicans, effectively blaming the Democrats for the depression, established a predominantly urban-industrial political base. Unlike the coalitions of Jackson and Franklin Roosevelt, the new GOP did not rest upon masses of new voters who demanded attention. Moreover, the GOP coalition was as much anti-Bryan as anything else; it was surel), not "progressive" in any twentieth century definition of that elusive term. But it gave McKinley a heavily Republican Congress and enabled him to claim a Jacksonian kind of mandate. "I can no longer be called the President of a party," he said. "I am now the President of a people. ' ' 
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MclKinley and his successors had still another potential advantage over their forerunners. This was the growth of pressures, which also grew during the depression of the 1890s, for governmental action to deal with a societx changing drastically under the impact of industrialization, urbanization, and mass immigration. At that time such pressure came primarily frlom potent interest groups, not (as temporarily in the 1930s) from ordinary citizens. It rested in large part on dread of social and political collapse, and on fears that other political institutions could not cope with modernization. Reflecting such expectations, the press added to this chorus for "reform"-and quadrupled its circulation between 1870 and 1920. As the municipalities, the states, and Congress proved inadequately equipped for decisive action, the presidency became a focus of hopes and aspirations.
These rising expectations were often unrealistic, even absurd: The presidency, indeed, was to be a crutch propping up a ragged society. In the long run the increased expectations hurt presidents, who Were led to make exaggerated promises and then failed to deliver. Such expectations led also to a faith in charismatic leadership, as if presidential personality could conquer all, and ultimately to the dogma of "our President, right or wrong." Nonetheless, the growth of pressure groups-and the rise in expectations which they developed-became one of the strongest forces in shaping the expanded twentieth century presidency. 4 Theodore Roosevelt took advantage of all these forces. The President, he felt, was the steward of the people. It was not only his duty but his "legal right to do whatever the needs of the people demand, unless the Constitution or the laws explicitly forbid him to do it. 5 Moving accordingly, he all but seized the Panama Canal. He challenged Congress, which struggled sporadically to contain him, by establishing a protectorate in Santo Domingo, by sending the "Great White Fleet" around the world, and by taking it upon himself to set aside forest reserves. Broadening executive control, he refused to let his attorney general explain to Congress why he had not instituted antitrust proceedings against United States Steel. Instead, Roosevelt ordered the relevant papers to the White House and dared the Senate to come after them. "The only way the Senate or the committee can get those papers," he chortled, "is through my impeachment.' L " One wonders if Nixon read Theodore Roosevelt's letters.
Theodore Roosevelt proved especially adept at using the new, mass circulation press to bring pressure on Congress. He employed a press secretary, provided reporters with space in the White House, and pioneered in the use of many modern strategems: off-the-record remarks, leaks, and Sunday proclamations for the front pages of Monday morning newspapers. When congressmen balked, as they did during the protracted struggle for the Hepburn Act, he appealed over their heads to the interest groups concerned. Most of all, he and his family were colorful. White House reporters never lacked for 54 Expanding on Roosevelt's initiatives, Wilson called twiceweekly press conferences until 1915. He publicized his policies by appearing personally before Congress to announce them, and by going directly to the people for their support."' Perceiving himself as a prime minister, he tried to work carefully with Congress, which was Democratic until 1919. In so doing he had to act pragmatically, often inconsistently. Like jefferson, he became ultimately dependent on his congressional supporters.
2 But he also showed that a president could be a strong legislative and party leader. Liberals like Lippmann were heartened by the show of executive purpose. In his conduct of foreign relations, Wilson acted in more high-handed ways designed to augment presidential initiative. His Mexican policies left Congress little choice but to approve the occupation of Vera Cruz and the expedition against Villa. During \Vorld War I he capitalized on what Corwin later called "altogether revolutionary legislation"" to set up executive agencies which attempted to oversee mobilization and which engineered far-reaching violations of civil liberties. Two policies of long-range importance-the 14 Points and the Siberian expedition-were developed without any real consultation with Congress. Like Theodore Roosevelt, he offered a model of charismatic leadership, which, though potentially dangerous, seemed to offer much to groups that despaired at the weakness of other political institutions. "[T]he President can exercise no power which cannot be failI and reasonlably traced to sone specific grant of power or justly implied and included within such express grant as proper and necessary to its exercise .... There is no undefined residI of power which he can exercise because it seems to him to be in the public interest. .. " Id. at 139-40.
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By focusing on the personalities of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover, it is easy to perceive an atrophy in presidential authority after 1920. Coolidge, after all, contended, "I have never felt it was my diuty to attempt to coerce Senators or Representatives, or to make reprisals. The people sent them to Washington. I felt I had discharged my dutV when I had done the best I could With them."1 4 Hoover added, "the militant safeguard to liberty . . .
[is]
legislative independence. . . . More particularly does the weakening of the legislative arm lead to encroachment by the executive upon legislative and judicial functions, and inevitably that encroachment is upon Individual liberty."" , Such rhetoric aside, these presidents did not reject opportunities to advance presidential authority. Like Wilson, Harding was quick to use federal troops for the pacification of labor disputes, while Coolidge followed the lead of both Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson in sending soldiers to the Caribbean without congressional consent." The GOP presidents also capitalized on the ever-present passion of the media for news about the White House. Harding restored regular press conferences, which had been a casualty of war and of \W\ilson's illness. He pioneered in use of the device of "White House spokesman." He was the first president to have a "speech writer" on his staff, and regularly to use amplification for public addresses. Coolidge, far from being the "quiet president," held regular press conferences not only to get himself in the news but also to influence legislation and to sustain business confidence. He made more public speeches than Wilson. Hoover, though a failure at press relations while president, had been a brilliant self-promoter while Secretary of Commerce under Harding and Coolidge.1 7 His assiduously cultivated image as the "great engineer' did much to propel him into the presidency and to increase expectations about the virtues of social engineering. In Wilson's struggle for the League of Nations merely intensified this faith. Instead of interpreting his defeat as a manifestation of popular disenchantment with spread-eagle rhetoric, progressives blamed a cabal of senatorial isolationists and partisans, denounced the legislative branch, and clamored loudly for a renaissance of presidential power. When Franklin Roosevelt expanded the office after 1932, he worked in a political culture whose liberal spokesmen already identified "reform" with "presidential leadership." Political scientists joined economists and other "experts" in promoting the second broad force toward presidential expansion in the 1920s: the passion for organization, rational planning, and efficiency. This passion, of course, was neither new to the 1920s nor applicable only to government. Moreover, in the 1920s the drive for efficiency often meant cost-cutting and small government, especially on the state level.
" In a general way, however, the drive for rational planning in the 1920s stemmed from dissatisfaction by elites with the "people" and with the corruption and wastefulness of legislative bodies. Given the essential "stupidity" of the people and of popularly elected representatives, it followed that experts in the executive branch must devise and administer programs. On the local level this attitude sustained the movement for city manager and commission forms of government, which peaked in the 1920s. On the national level it meant the growth of organized social science to package socio-economic policy. The Budget Act of 1921, which made it the role of the executive branch to propose annual budgets, was merely the most dramatic sign of the trend toward social engineering. 9 Hoover's research committees on social and economic trends, and the Reorganization Act of 1939 establishing an executive office, were later manifestations. In advancing this tradition-and utilizing exponents of it such as Rexford Tugwell and Adolf Berle-Roosevelt was on familiar territory. The presidency, America's "great engine of democracy," was becoming an alternative to "misrtile" by the Congress or subservience to the "interests."
IV Franklin Roosevelt's contributions to an expanded presidency are well- The sources of Roosevelt's strength until 1937 resembled those of other strong Presidents. Like McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, he had little to fear from the opposition party, which was badly demoralized. Like Jackson, he drew popular support from a rising coalition of new voters-generally the immigrants, blacks, blue collar workers, and poor people of the 1930s. Like Wilson, he enjoyed partisan backing in Congress. Above all, he came to power after four years of depression, which American political institutions seemed incapable of ending. In desperation, ordinary citizens now echoed the clemands of social engineers in crying out for action ft om the central government. Remembering Theodore Roosevelt and \\ilson, they looked first to the presidency for charismatic leadership. The major forces assisting a strong presidency in the past-a new political universe, an emergency situation, the apparent paralysis of other institutions, a yearning for leadership-combined at once in 1933 to give Franklin Roosevelt unparalleled opportunities for broadening his reach. And as the fascist menace developed in the late 1930s, the threat of war-historically the strongest force of all behind presidential aggrandizement-gave the President yet one more, ultimately unassailable, reason to provide energetic leadership. complained that "we are tending at the moment toward a form of one-man government administered through myriad bureaus whose administrators write the laws, interpret them in application, and punish violations with their own decrees and penalties.1 7 3 A more scholarly critic, Edward Corwin, wrote in 1941 that "the President dominates Congress by the hold which fat relief rolls give him over millions of voters, and so a Vicious circle is created whereby Congress pays for its own slow enslavement." He added that "propaganda, once the casual art of a gifted few, has been converted into a skilled technic 1 ue, which is supplemented by the most ingenious gadgets of mechanical science."
In the long run, some of Corwin's fears proved well-founded. Roosevelt's frustrations in domestic matters suggested several relevant facts about the presidency before 1940. First, power did not exist as in a zero-sum game: while the presidents extended their reach, so did Congress and the federal bureaucracy. Second, interest groups might call for vigorous presidential leadership-and thereby enhance expectations-but they showed little desire to help the White House secure legislation which did not directly benefit them. Third, presidential popularity at election time did not--does notnecessarily lead to a rise in presidential power. After 1937 Roosevelt and his successors were rarely able to transform electoral strength into clout on Capitol Hill. For all these reasons the gap between actual presidential power-measured as the capacity to get people to do things they otherwise might not have done-and expectations of power, was wide indeed.
Hemmed in as he was on the domestic front, Roosevelt might logically have used foreign affairs as a means of enhancing his authority. Wars and threats of war, after all, had been primary causes of expansion in presidential power. In 1940-1941 he did move in that direction. At that time he ordered wire-tapping to be used on "suspected spies" and on people "suspected of subversive activities" damaging to the nation's foreign policy. 77 Like his predecessors in times of need, he impounded funds on a small scale. He took steps of highly questionable legality, like the destroyer deal, to secure his aims. Even so, he acted with restraint, in part because Congress was unusually watchful and suspicious. Roosevelt's relative openness and political caution, indeed, contrasted sharply with the later high-handedness of Johnson and Nixon. In 1941 the foreign affairs presidency was far from the potent force it was to become in the postwar years.
Still, the rapidity with which Franklin Roosevelt and his successors extended their power after 1940 suggests the potency, as of that time, of forces assisting ambitious Presidents. The labor unions, a growing new force in electoral politics, were now disposed to support strong executive leadership.
8
Their presence among the plethora of interest groups created added pressures on Presidents to act decisively. Moreover, many liberal social scientists and intellectuals continued to place their faith in the Theodore Roosevelt-Wilsonian model of leadership. As in earlier years, these "experts" were contemptuous of Congress, worried about the "interests," and were persuaded that the nation needed political centralization. The 1930s witnessed the fateful convergence of expectations-by voters, interest groups, and liberal social scientists-in presidential potential.
No one typified such views more clearly than the English political scientist, Harold Laski, whose book on the American presidency appeared in 1939. Laski called eloquently for the strengthening of the presidency, the best weapon against sectionalism, corporate interest groups, and decentralized political parties. "America," he said, "needs strong government; it needs strong leadership to attain strong government; only the President, granted its characteristics, can provide it with the leadership it requires." Such leadership was especially essential in foreign policy. "The citizen," Laski wrote, "looks to his [the President's] pronouncements with exceptional anxiety. He has the sense, as never before, that America is a world power, and that his President must play his part in a manner proportionate to the influence of the United States in world affairs." Neustadtj' he stressed the key connections between presidential popularity, prestige, ability to persuade, and power. Later advocates of a strong presidency elaborated on his ideas, but did not disagree with the basic perspective. Like Laski, like many anxious Americans in the age of depression and world war, they saw no better way of bringing order to a frayed society, of compensating for decentralized political parties and the federal system, or of combatting fascism and comm1unisn. Given such expectations for activist leadership-and the gap which separated these expectations from constitutional authority-it was not surprising that Presidents after 1940 looked for ways to maximize their influence, even if it meant riding I-oughshod over constitutional guarantees and civil liberties.
